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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the experience of Indonesia in adopting gross receipts taxes as one of the 
elements in the architecture of its tax system. Although Indonesian income tax law and value-
added tax law do not explicitly impose gross receipts taxes, however, these laws authorize the 
use of presumptive taxation methods, which in practice are essentially gross receipts taxes. In the 
past three decades there have been expansions in the use of these presumptive methods in the tax 
system. As gross receipts tax is considered to be one of the most distortive tax systems, its 
expansions may also mean that its distortive effects may have expanded throughout the 
economy. Nevertheless, if well-designed and properly managed, gross receipts taxes might serve 
as an effective instrument to broadening the tax base particularly in countries with a significant 
presence of the informal sector, while still minimizing its adverse impacts on the economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A gross receipts tax is a tax that is imposed against the receipts of a business’s total sales. In 
most modern developed economies gross receipts taxes had largely disappeared as an important 
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source of revenue. It is possible that the waning role of gross receipts taxes may have to do with 
the drawbacks inherent in this type of tax: they violate the fundamental principles of tax policy, 
mainly economic efficiency, equity and transparency.  
The first comprehensive tax reform in Indonesia was launched in 1984 and was aimed at 
replacing the country’s outdated taxation systems which were inefficient, overly complex and 
riddled with loopholes.2 The most notable elements in the reform was the adoption of Value-
Added Tax (VAT) law to replace sales tax and the introduction of self-assessment system in the 
new income tax law. Initially designed to avoid the same problems of the tax systems they 
replaced, the laws brought by this reform severely limited the use of presumptive taxation with 
the expectation that the efficiency, integrity and comprehensiveness of the tax systems could be 
maintained. In the past three decades, however, there have been amendments to these laws and 
one of the adverse results of these amendments is expansions in the use of gross receipts taxes as 
a special regime in the architecture of the tax systems. 
The expansions of gross receipts taxes may be dilemmatic since, on the one side, it is 
considered to be one of the most economically distortive tax instruments and, on the other side, a 
well-designed and properly managed gross receipts taxes may play an important role in 
encouraging enterprises operating in the informal economy to migrate to the formal economy 
and be part of the taxpaying population, amid the limited resources on the part of the tax 
administration. However, research on gross receipts taxes in Indonesia has been scarce. This 
article aims to contribute to filling this gap by examining the role of the gross receipts taxes in 
creating economic distortions while simultaneously serves as an instrument to reduce the costs of 
compliance for taxpayers and the costs of tax administration, particularly in relation to small 
taxpayers.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Appropriate design of a tax system may serve as one of the major issues in public finance. 
Designing such an appropriate system, however, may not an easy task since it has to strike 
balance among various ideal attributes of taxation: Taxes must be levied (revenue-yield) without 
exerting unnecessary costs on taxpayers or the tax administration (simplicity) while giving fair 
treatment to individuals (equity) and minimizing interference on their decisions (efficiency) 
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(Alm, 1999). However, a tax system may not be able to be entirely evaluated from the standpoint 
of the principled vacuum of an ideal world (Testa & Mattoon, 2007) since it may be chosen to be 
enacted based on political and administrative constraints that a government has to confront in the 
real world. The need to strike a balance between these variables raises a strand of literature 
labeled the theory of optimal taxation. 
Theory of optimal taxation rests on the principle that the government is required to raise a 
specified amount of revenue through a tax system that maximizes social welfare function 
contingent on a set of constraints (Mankiw, Weinzierl, & Yagan, 2009). Hence, a second-best 
nature may serve as the overarching characteristic of the optimal taxation theory. As such, the 
basic question the theory tries to answer is how best to raise revenues in a second-best world 
(Boadway, 2012). 
Early major contribution in the optimal tax theory is the seminal paper by Ramsey (1927) 
which proposed a way to raise revenues from a representative agent that left the agent as well off 
as possible under the assumed constraint that commodity taxes is the only revenue raising 
instrument available for the government. Ramsey suggested that in order to minimize the 
efficiency costs, such taxes should tax different commodities differently in such a way that goods 
with inelastic demands should be taxed at relatively higher rates. This work was revived by 
Samuelson (1986) who rephrased Ramsey’ proposition within the framework of the principal-
agent problem in which the government could be regarded as the principal and taxpayer as the 
agent.  
One critical drawback of the Ramsey’s model, however, is the rigid constraint it placed 
on the ability of the government to choose the best among various tax systems (Mankiw et al., 
2009). Ruling out other conceivable tax systems merely by assumption is problematic in the 
perspective of the optimal taxation theory itself since the theory basically aims to derive the best 
tax system to finance public expenditures without exerting unnecessary distortions on the 
economy. On the other hand, if there were no constraint in the ability of the government in 
choosing a tax system then the optimal tax would simply be a lump-sum tax. In a theoretical 
world where the economy is described by a representative agent, the lump-sum tax would not 
interfere with the choices made by that agent thus a tax could be collected with no efficiency 
costs. Nonetheless, in the real world the most important reason why lump-sum tax is rarely used 
is that this tax fails to recognize the heterogeneity among taxpayers – particularly related to their 
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ability to pay. This is because with a lump-sum tax, rich and poor individuals would have to pay 
the same amount thus placing relatively higher burden on the part of the latter.  
The second major contribution to the theory of optimal taxation was the work of Mirrlees 
(1971) which dealt explicitly with the issue of taxpayers’ heterogeneity. In his work, Mirrlees 
(1971) recognized the previously unobserved heterogeneity, diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption and the incentive effects of taxation. Thus the trade-off between equality and 
efficiency, both has to be carefully considered by governments in the real world, are formalized 
in the model (Mankiw et al., 2009). Models built within the Mirrleesian framework (see, for 
example, in Little and Mirrlees (1974); Ray (1984)) typically assume that the government cannot 
directly observes individuals’ ability to pay (this assumption may be closer to reality) hence it 
has to rely on surrogate characteristics of ability to pay which is easily observable; and the 
closest surrogate is the income received by each taxpayer (Musgrave, 1967). Nonetheless, since 
the income of an individual depends on that person’s capability and effort – which both of them 
cannot be directly observed – the government has to strike a balance between how much income 
that should be taken from an individual and that individual’s effort to earn that income. On the 
one hand, if the tax level was set too high then individuals might reduce their work efforts and 
this may distort economic efficiency. On the other hand, if the tax level was set too low the 
government might have difficulties in providing public services as well as in reducing economic 
inequalities. 
Hence, in the Mirleesian perspective the problem of optimal taxation evolves into the 
problem of asymmetric information between the government and taxpayers (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 
1976; Mankiw et al., 2009). The government has to design a tax system that is able to transfer 
income from people with high ability to those with low ability, subject to incomplete information 
on its part in determining the ability of each individual. It is the difficulties related to the problem 
of asymmetric information which makes the theory of optimal taxation an interesting and 
difficult subject. An optimal tax system should provide sufficient incentives and minimize 
distortions in order to maintain a high level of economic output from taxpayers with high 
abilities to earn incomes even though they are targeted with higher taxes. 
Recent examples of the literature within the Mirrleesian tradition include the works of 
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009); Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) and 
Kindermann and Krueger (2014) which explored various optimal taxation policies for capital and 
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labor incomes. Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003); Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) and 
Kocherlakota (2005) examined the various properties related to optimal distortions and their 
relationships with taxes. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) explored the theoretical basis as well as 
provided numerical examples of the optimal taxation of capital and labor in a dynamic economy 
with intermittent shocks. Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006) explored the determinants of 
dynamic optimal taxation in a two-period settings. Weinzierl (2011) studied the theoretical and 
quantitative exercises related to age-dependent labor income taxes and showed that these taxes 
might provide larger welfare gains compared to a fully optimal and more complex tax policy.  
Tanzi (2008) argued, however, that despite the vast literature available on optimal 
taxation theory its practical implementations in tax reforms might be limited. According to 
Tanzi, many countries have limited capacity in producing the statistical and informational 
specifications as required by the optimal taxation theory. Further, the political capital needed for 
implementing an optimal taxation reform might be beyond the threshold a government is willing 
to spend.  
On the contrary, Boadway (2012) maintained that it is inconceivable that ideas and 
principles drawn from normative optimal taxation theory cannot play an important role in tax 
policy. There is a strong and essential symbiosis between normative optimal tax analyses and the 
tax policies actually enacted. Further, Boadway argued that although this connection might not 
be able to be observed directly, policy prescriptions proposed by many tax policy specialists and 
tax commissions have always been informed by some ideas drawn from normative tax theory. 
Recent example includes the widespread adoption of VAT, which is generally regarded as a less 
distortionary form of indirect tax (James, 2015, p. 26). Another example encompasses policies 
aimed at tackling the problem of asymmetric information, such as keeping close track on transfer 
recipients, monitoring taxpayer adherence to tax laws and basing taxes on easily observable 
surrogates (Boadway, 2012, p. 2). 
 
GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES IN INDONESIA 
Although Indonesia income tax law and VAT law3 do not explicitly impose gross receipts taxes, 
however, some articles in these laws stipulate that presumptive taxation can be applied for 
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certain transactions or business sectors. The method to calculate the taxes payable under these 
presumptive systems is similar to how a gross receipts tax is calculated, i.e. the amount of sales 
(or turnover) multiplied by the corresponding tax rate. 
For the reason of simplicity, Indonesia income tax law ruled that a final income tax may 
be levied upon delivery of certain goods and services. The final taxes paid cannot be credited and 
the taxes due are calculated by multiplying gross revenues with the respective tariffs – hence in 
essence they are gross receipts taxes. Therefore, despite its name, the final income taxes could 
not be considered as taxes on income because they tax business receipts, not business profits. In 
other words, the income taxes are not imposed based on the economic ability of businesses but 
based on the gross receipts obtained by these businesses. For a tax system to be classified as an 
income tax the system should provide an allowance mechanism for the actual costs incurred by 
businesses in their efforts to generate revenues thus the base of imposition of an income tax must 
reflect taxpayers’ heterogeneity in their ability to earn income. Different costs incurred by 
different businesses may serve as surrogates for the different ability of each taxpayer in earning 
income. 
Currently, Indonesian final income tax is imposed on the following: interest income; 
lottery prize; transaction involving stock and/or derivative instrument; transaction involving the 
transfer of land and/or building; construction service; real estate business; leasing of land and/or 
building; delivery of fuel and/or gas to distributor; revaluation of fixed asset; dividend income; 
shipping lines and international flight service. 
Moreover, a final income tax also is also levied on small enterprise with annual turnover 
not exceeding 4.8 billion Rupiah. Regardless of their industry, these small businesses have the 
option to choose to pay the final income tax at 0.5 percent of their turnover for a specified 
number of years rather than to calculate their tax payable based on the more complex regular 
income tax system. This provision is meant to be a special and simplified tax system intended for 
small taxpayers so that they would have the time needed to develop their bookkeeping 
capabilities. This special system is also intended to incentivize small enterprises to leave the 
underground economy and enter the formal economy thus expanding the tax base. 
Indonesia VAT law provides that for certain transactions the tax payable may be based on 
‘other value’ which is determined by means of a decree. Under this scheme, the VATs due are 
based on these other values (not the actual sale prices) and the input taxes paid are not 
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recoverable. Further, the law also stipulates that in order to determine the amount of VAT due 
for certain businesses, a truncated base scheme may be instituted. Under this scheme, the amount 
of input tax that can be recovered is deemed (by a decree) at a certain percentage of the 
corresponding sales – not the actual input taxes paid by a business. These truncated base schemes 
result in effective tax rates that varies depending on the types of goods and services delivered as 
well as depending on the industry in which a business operates. The amount of tax due is 
calculated by multiplying the corresponding effective tax rate with the amount of sales. Hence, 
although it is named as VAT, the method to determine how much tax that is due under these 
schemes is similar to gross receipts taxes, i.e. turnover multiplied by tariff.  
Currently, the presumptive schemes in VAT are applied for several businesses: used car 
dealership; delivery of gold jewelry; delivery of tobacco products; package delivery services; 
tour and travel services; freight forwarding agency; delivery of certain fertilizers; businesses with 
annual turnover not exceeding Rp1.8 billion; certain retailers; factoring services and certain sole 
proprietorship entities. 
Table 1 presents the various gross receipts taxes currently applied in Indonesia. At the 
start of the 1984 tax reform, the businesses mentioned in Table 1 were all taxed under the regular 
income tax and VAT system. However, subsequent amendments have put these business 
activities under the gross receipts taxation system. Hence, Table 1 might reflect the expansions in 
the use of gross receipts taxes in the architecture of Indonesian tax system. It shows that there are 
22 different rates applicable for 23 business sectors – and the table is not intended to be 
exhaustive. 
The list of rates in Table 1 also reflects the surprisingly complex gross receipts taxation 
in Indonesia, although the tax was supposedly intended to be a simplified system. Identical 
economic transactions and businesses operating in the same industry may face different tax rates, 
depending on various conditions such as the legal form of the seller (e.g., corporation or natural 
person), buyer’s status (e.g., distributor or end consumer) and business ownership (e.g., 
domestically owned or foreign subsidiary).  
Hence, after more than three decades of reform the presumptive taxation – initially 
designed to reduce the administrative and compliance costs for a small number of businesses – 
has evolved into a complex system of gross receipts taxes that is applied on many business 
activities. This complexity requires a specialized knowledge on behalf of the taxpayers and as 
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such may increase compliance costs, particularly for the small taxpayers who typically do not 
have the resources and capabilities to acquire such knowledge. Moreover, gross receipts taxes 
may create economic distortions and their expansions may also expand the distortive effects 
throughout the economy. 
 
Table 1. Rates of Sales Tax 
Business Activity 
Tax Rate 
(% of Turnover) 
Enterprise with annual turnover not exceeding Rp4.8 billion 0.5 
Enterprise with annual turnover not exceeding Rp1.8 billion 3; 4* 
Construction services 2; 3; 4; 6* 
Sale of stocks 0.1; 0.6* 
Transfers of land and/or building 0; 1; 2.5* 
Real estate business 1 
Leasing of land and/or building 10 
Delivery of fuel and/or gas 0.25; 0.3* 
Oil and gas services 5; 7; 20* 
Dividend income 10 
Interest income and bond discount 0; 2.5; 5; 7.5; 10; 20* 
Lottery prize 25 
Shipping line 1.2; 2.64* 
Built, operate and transfer operations 5 
International flight services 2.64 
Used car dealerships 1 
Gold jewelry 2 
Tobacco products 9.1 
Package delivery services 1 
Tour and travel services 1 
Freight forwarding services 1 
Subsidized fertilizers 9.09 
Factoring business 0.5 
Note: * Applicable rate depends on various conditions. 
Sources: Government Regulations, analyzed. 
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THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF GROSS RECEIPTS TAX  
Within the economic profession, gross receipts tax is considered to be one of the most 
economically harmful tax instruments due to the economic inefficiencies it caused (Barbé & 
Zodrow, 2014). The history of gross receipts tax can be traced back to the 14th Century Europe. 
In his book, Adam Smith criticized the sales taxation which is a form of gross receipts tax in 
Spain (known as alcabala or alcavala, which started to be imposed in 13424) as hampering 
growth in manufacturing sector and thus laying the groundwork for the country’s rapid economic 
decelerations in the 17th Century (Smith, 1776).  
In the post-World War I years gross receipts taxes became an important source of 
government revenue particularly in France and Germany since their economies were devastated 
by the war. This trend continued among European countries until the VAT replaced the sales tax 
in the 1960s and 1970s. In the U.S, sales tax emerged in the mid-19th century and became an 
important revenue instrument in the late 1920s and 1930s following the collapse of state finances 
due to the Great Depression (Mikesell, 2007).  
Proponents of the gross receipts taxes generally put forth at least two arguments. First, 
gross receipts tax’s simple structure is argued to be advantageous since on the part of the tax 
authority it is easier to be administered and on the part of the taxpayers it is easier to comply 
with, relative to the conventional income tax system. Second, gross receipts tax is argued to be 
politically attractive to policymakers since it could be imposed on a broad base hence a given 
amount of revenue could be raised at lower rates relative to other tax instruments (Chamberlain 
& Fleenor, 2007). Further, gross receipts tax may be chosen to be enacted as revenue instrument 
because policymakers and the public may see it as a relatively minor and innocuous levy since it 
is generally hidden from most taxpayers and having a (misleadingly) low rate (Pogue, 2007).  
However, the seemingly simple gross receipts taxes may come at some costs to the 
economy. In an efficient market the relative prices of goods as well as the choices on how to best 
organize for doing businesses should be determined by the marketplace – not by the peculiarity 
of the tax systems. In this sense, the tax system should be designed to be as economically neutral 
as possible. A well-designed tax system should minimize how much the tax directs the choices of 
businesses away from those which would have been made when no tax was imposed. Gross 
receipts taxes, however, may cause large distortions throughout the economy due to its inherent 
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non-neutral characteristics. The potential economic problems arising from the fundamental 
shortcomings of the gross receipts tax are as follows. 
1. Tax Pyramiding 
One important characteristic of a general gross receipts tax is that the tax is imposed at each 
stage of production and distribution – from extraction, manufacturing, wholesale to retail). These 
multiple levies may lead to tax pyramiding since there is no credit mechanism for the taxes paid 
on the intermediate inputs. Further, depending on the length of production and distribution 
stages, this process of pyramiding could create differences in the effective tax rate of the final 
products (Pogue, 2007). Complicated products which have to go through multiple production 
stages that are conducted by different firms would end up having higher effective tax rates 
compared to products that are produced entirely within a company or simple products that 
require fewer production stages. This is because the value created in the earlier stages of 
production would be taxed repeatedly along the production chains. By the same token, products 
that require multiple distribution channels (due to large geographical area that they have to cover 
to reach end consumers, for example) would also bear higher effective tax rates than products 
with shorter distribution chains. 
These rate differentials could distort the relative prices of goods and services as well as 
shift economic agents’ decisions regarding resource allocations. Hence economic inefficiencies 
could emerge due to the non-neutral nature of the tax system. For example, experience in 
Germany showed how sales taxes caused variations in the effective burdens of taxation, 
depending on the length of production and distribution stages as well as on the capital and labor 
intensity of a product. A study conducted across Germany’s industries in 1952 found that the 
effective tax rates on several commodities ranged from as low as 3.2 percent (for electricity, 
although it was legally tax-exempt) to as high as 12.5 percent (for linen bedspreads) (Institut fur 
Wirtstchaftsforschung, 1952 as cited in Due, 1957). Another example, sales taxes applied in 
Washington State (named Business and Occupation Tax) was found to have a substantial degree 
of tax pyramiding in a range of 1.4 times at its lowest to 6.7 times at its highest (Washington 
State Tax Structure Study Committe, 2002). Further, a study for Canada by Smart and Bird 
(2009) found empirical evidence that there was an estimated 100 percent forward-shifting tax 
incidence that lead to tax pyramiding across different sectors of the economy. 
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In the long run, tax rate differentials may have significant adverse impacts on the 
economy as they would affect the rates of return in different industries and this would distort 
business decisions. Decisions on opening up a new firm in an industry or closing a firm in 
another one may be affected by even small differences in the effective tax rates. As time goes by 
the patterns of investment as well as the industrial structures of an economy could be shaped by 
variations in the effective tax rate, not by efficiency considerations. 
2. Distortions in Business Structure 
The existence of tax pyramiding could incentivize businesses to produce goods in-house, for 
example by establishing new division or absorbing suppliers through mergers or acquisitions. 
Producing internally would shorten the production chains and this would minimize the adverse 
effects of tax pyramiding. Consolidations would enable firms to reduce their business-to-
business transfers of intermediate goods and services hence they would reduce the effective 
burdens from the gross receipts taxes.  
There is qualification to this statement, however, since the incentives for vertical 
integration would be reduced when the tax savings from producing intermediate inputs in-house 
are less than when firms buy from outside suppliers. When the tax systems are neutral, 
enterprises would choose the most efficient business structures subject to the existing constraints, 
for example competitions from other firms or other industries. Firms, however, may be 
encouraged to integrate vertically if they calculate that the tax savings they could get exceed the 
inefficiency loss from the tax-induced vertical integration. Nonetheless, although firms may 
benefit from this tax-induced inefficiency, the society at large may have to pay the price through 
shrinkages in other parts of the economy or even in the overall output of the economy.  
3. Equity Issue 
The issue of equity in a tax system may relate to how the costs of government services are 
divided among members of the society based on one’s ability to pay and the benefits one 
receives from the services the government provides. In this respect, gross receipts taxes may be a 
bad candidate to be chosen as an instrument to measure the relative ability to pay between 
taxpayers. A firm with a high turnover does not necessarily have higher capacity to bear the costs 
of government services since that would depend on the firm’s profitability. On the other hand, a 
small firm with a lower turnover could have higher profitability and thus have higher ability to 
pay for the costs of government services. 
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Gross receipts taxes may also create inequity across economic sectors. The tax would fall 
particularly hard on industries which have the characteristics of tight competition, high turnover 
and low profit margins (Mikesell, 2007). Firms in these industries would find it hard to shift the 
tax incidence forward to consumers and thus have to reduce their profits to absorb the burdens of 
the gross receipts taxes. This tax-induced low profit margin would adversely affect the 
survivability of such firms, particularly during economic downturns. 
Moreover, the incentives for vertical integration arising from tax pyramiding may favor 
larger firms over smaller competitors that cannot afford business consolidation thus creating 
significant problems of discrimination against small, nonintegrated firms (Due, 1959). A gross 
receipts tax would advantage larger firms which own in-house production facilities or have the 
capabilities to purchase directly from manufacturers over smaller firms which may have to buy 
from distributors. This is because larger firms would be able to minimize the size of tax 
pyramiding through shorter production chains. Further, competition from integrated firms would 
make it difficult for nonintegrated firms to shift the tax burden due to the higher effective rates 
imposed by the larger magnitude of tax pyramiding confronted by these nonintegrated firms. 
Pogue (1999, 2007) argued that the distortionary nature of the sales tax may not be the 
result of differences in the effective tax rates in itself but rather this non-neutrality may rise due 
to the inaccuracy of the effective tax rate differentials in reflecting the differences in the social 
costs imposed by business activities. Economic efficiency principle dictates that businesses 
should internalize the costs that they are otherwise would not consider in choosing what, where 
and how to produce. Hence, a tax may serve as a means of confronting businesses with the costs 
borne by the government to provide public services, thus forcing businesses to treat these 
services not as free goods but rather as economic goods which have to be used judiciously. 
However, due to the distortions it caused, a gross receipts tax may not be an effective instrument 
to properly charge each business according the costs it exerted on the society. 
For the case of Indonesia, the equity problem of the tax system is compounded by the fact 
that businesses with annual turnover exceeding Rp4.8 billion fall under the regular income tax 
system. Hence, for these larger businesses, taxes are paid based on net income (i.e. total sales 
deducted by total costs) – not on the total sales per se. This differentiated system may distort 
buyers’ decision on who to buy from, since these buyers may have to bear the tax burdens 
emanating from tax pyramiding when they buy from smaller firms that fall under the gross 
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receipts taxation system. As such, gross receipts taxes would bias unfavorably against small 
businesses with annual turnover less than Rp4.8 billion.5 
4. Opaqueness 
The design of a good tax system should allow taxpayers, whether they are businesses or end 
consumers, to be informed on when and how much taxes they have to pay. When citizens do not 
know the costs of government services and who will bear these costs then it could be hard to 
expect them to make judicious decisions regarding government services (Washington State Tax 
Structure Study Committe, 2002).  
A gross receipts tax may be opaque in terms of who actually bear the burden of the tax. 
Although it may be supposed to be a tax on business, however, it may not be clear who actually 
pays the tax – it could fall on business owner, owner of production inputs (including labor) or 
consumer (Mikesell, 2007). This obscurity regarding who really pays the costs of government 
services could be counterproductive in ensuring the accountability of public sector policies (Bird, 
2003). 
To add with, the gross receipts tax’s problem of transparency may also be compounded 
by the existence of tax pyramiding. As the tax pyramided through production and distribution 
chains, it might not be possible to know the extent in which these layers of taxation have 
increased the prices end consumers have to pay. Even if end consumers might know the tax rates 
imposed on goods and services they bought, it might be unlikely that they have complete 
information on how the prices have been inflated by the pyramiding effects. Opaqueness in the 
actual amount of tax burden borne by taxpayers may hamper informed and transparent decision-
making regarding the actual costs of government services. 
5. Favoring Imports Over Domestic Goods 
Generally the VATs paid for imported products are recoverable and these products may not bear 
the burden of VAT in its country of origin since exports are usually zero-rated. Hence, 
businesses would have the incentives to import intermediate goods rather than acquiring them 
through domestic sources when these domestic sources are under the gross receipts taxes system. 
This is because the buyer of intermediate goods may have to bear the burden of gross receipts 
taxes when they buy domestically produced goods while they could simply avert this problem by 
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importing those same goods. This tax-induced distortion may erode the competitiveness of 
domestic industries as well as put unnecessary pressures on the country’s balance of payments. 
6. Complications in Enforcement 
In Indonesia, there basically are two systems of consumption taxes enacted in one jurisdiction: 
VAT and gross receipts taxes. These system (and rate) differentiations may create scope for 
fraudulent misclassifications as well as increase administrative and compliance costs. Moreover, 
imposing gross receipts taxes for some parts of the economy in a country where VAT is also 
imposed on other, broader economic sectors would break the chain of VAT at the point where 
goods or services enter the industries under the gross receipts tax system. Ideally, VAT should be 
imposed on all levels of production and distribution chains – from the point where goods and 
services start their production process until the point where they reached end consumers. This 
way, the tax authority would be able to follow the flow of goods and services through the 
invoice-and-credit mechanism provided by the VAT system. Breaking this chain, however, 
would cut the information from the VAT’s invoice-and-credit mechanism which supposedly 
flows to the tax authority thus adding to the complications in enforcing compliance.  
All in all, a tax system should be designed in the best possible way to minimize 
distortions to economic choices made by individuals and businesses. The functions of 
competitive markets in allocating resources should not be interfered by the existing tax systems 
as this would be advantageous for the society at large. The public may have to pay higher prices 
for goods and services than would otherwise necessary due to the distortionary designs of the tax 
systems. This could cause living standards to be lower than would otherwise be attainable when 
the tax systems do not distort economic decisions (Mikesell, 2007). 
 
GROSS RECEIPTS TAX FOR THE HARD-TO-TAX 
Despite its distortionary effects, the perception that gross receipts tax is simple to administer and 
to comply with might make this tax instrument to be seen as a solution to broaden the tax base, 
particularly in countries with significant presence of the informal6 sector in the economy and this 
informal sector is usually hard to tax. This might fit Indonesia which has a significant presence 
of the informal economy. Previous studies on the size of informal economy in Indonesia 
provided various results, however, with one study estimated it to be around 25 percent of Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) (Wibowo, 2001) while other studies’ estimates were at approximately 
20 percent of GDP (Tatariyanto, 2014) and 18 percent of GDP (Schneider, Buehn, & 
Montenegro, 2010).7  
Limited resources and skills generally put constraint on the capacity of tax authorities, 
particularly in developing countries such as Indonesia. Hence, they must often face a dilemma: 
whether to direct the scarce resources toward smaller taxpayers who are typically hard to tax in 
order to uphold the integrity and equity of the tax system although the payout could be 
insignificant or to go after instead larger firms that are typically already in the tax net and may 
provide substantial payout with the risk of overburdening them.  
Part of a good tax administration requires that large taxpayers should be closely 
monitored in order to keep them complying to the tax laws at the highest possible levels, 
particularly to matters related with filing, assessment and collection of the taxes due (Benon, 
Baer, & Toro, 2002). However, disproportionate emphasis on large taxpayers may, in the long 
run, pose some dangerous risks. As large taxpayers feel that pressures put upon them increases, 
they may become increasingly agitated and thus increases their incentives to evolve into 
allegedly off-shore operation or break down their business structures into groups of small entities 
to minimize the overwhelming pressures from the tax authority (Bird & Wallace, 2004). 
 In that sense, monitoring the small, hard-to-tax businesses may matter to policy makers 
even though in the short run this may not seem to be a cost-effective strategy. Left uncontrolled, 
the hard-to-tax sector may pose significant adverse economic impacts. Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, 
and Schneider (2004) found that the hard to tax, particularly in developing countries, may have 
significant negative impacts on tax revenue. They also found that unintended changes in the tax 
structure may arise in accordance to the size of the hard to tax, for example countries might have 
to put greater reliance on indirect taxation instruments when the size of the hard to tax was too 
high. Further, excess burdens due to misallocation of resources seem to be correlated with the 
existence of the hard to tax and this could result in quite large welfare losses. Developing 
countries’ long-run economic growth tended to be inversely related to the size of the hard to tax: 
the larger the hard to tax in a country, the slower would be its long-run economic growth. Alm et 
 
7
 Other studies provided much lower estimates: 6 percent of GDP in Nizar and Purnomo (2011) and 8.33 percent of 
GDP in Samuda (2016). Although there are differences in what constitutes as an underground economy and in 
research methods, these estimates seem unlikely since they are far below the average in advanced OECD economies 
(13.4 percent in Schneider et al. (2010)). 
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al. (2004) argued that the overall equity of the tax system would be able to be improved when the 
hard to tax pay their fair share of taxes. 
 Further, low compliance rates particularly in the lower end of the economic scale may 
serve as one of the dominant problems with the tax system (Bahl, 2004). Taxpayers in the formal 
economy who cannot escape taxation by going underground would have to pay their full tax 
liabilities and may face excessive burdens when significant numbers of businesses in the hard-to-
tax sector can freely evade their tax obligations. As a result, tax burdens would be unfairly 
distributed among members of society and this might erode public’s trust in the fiscal system in 
particular and the government in general. 
Evaluating the performance of the gross receipts taxes as a special system for the hard to 
tax in Indonesia might not be a straightforward exercise due to, firstly, the limited published data 
on the revenue performance of such taxes; and secondly, the difficulties in controlling for other 
changes to the tax system and the economy. Nonetheless, overviews on the performance of tax 
revenues in general might provide rough guidelines as well as provide first expression and 
assessment on the role of gross receipts taxes in the broader Indonesian tax system.  
Figure 1 presents the tax revenue collected by Indonesian central government as a 
percentage GDP for period 1984-2016. It shows that in the first six years after the tax reform, in 
period 1984-1989, the annual average of the tax ratio was only 5.1 percent of GDP. This 
relatively low levels of tax ratio might be understandable because the tax authority and taxpayers 
needed time to learn the new system of self-assessment from the previous official assessment 
system as well as to learn the newly introduced VAT. Nevertheless, there were steep increases in 
the tax ratio during this time period which might signify a steep learning curve for both the tax 
authority and taxpayers.  
In the next period, 1990-1999, increases in tax ratio were less steep than previously albeit 
at significantly higher levels, with an annual average of 8.9 percent of GDP. This trend continued 
in period 2000-2008 with an annual average of 9.4 percent with its peak reached in 2008 with a 
tax ratio of 10.9 percent of GDP. This trend reversed, however, in period 2009-2016 and there 
were persistent declines with an annual average of just 9.0 percent of GDP. This declining trend 
occurred even after the gross receipts tax was expanded in 2013 to include businesses with an 
annual turnover not exceeding Rp4.8 billion. 
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Figure 1. Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP, 1984-2016 
Note: data on tax revenue consist of self-assessed taxes collected by Indonesia central government, i.e. income tax 
and VAT. 
Sources: Government of Indonesia (Various Years); Indonesia Central Board of Statistics (Various Years); 
Indonesia Ministry of Finance (Various Years), analyzed. 
  
 A discouraging picture emerges when the tax revenue is seen from another perspective. 
Figure 2 presents the growth rates of tax revenue for 1985-2016, with the dashed line indicating 
its proximate long-run trend. The highest levels of growth in tax revenue were reached within the 
first few years after the tax reform of 1984 with an annual average growth of 21.5 percent for 
period 1985-1989. Afterward, the average growth rates persistently declined: 8.6 percent for 
1990-1999, 8.0 percent in 2000-2008 and 3.6 percent in 2009-2016. Particularly, for period 
2009-2016, the average growth of tax revenue was lower than the average growth of the 
economy which reached an average rate of 5.4 percent during the same period. 
Overall, data presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 may indicate, among others, the limited 
role of gross receipts taxes in Indonesia as a special tax regime to bringing the underground 
economy into the official tax net, broadening the tax base and improving revenue performance. 
One of the possible explanations for these sub-optimal performances may relate to taxpayers 
who, after entering the tax system, are ‘disappearing’ once again by going underground. Figure 3 
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presents the numbers of registered taxpayers required to submit annual returns and the tax returns 
actually submitted. 
 
 
Figure 2. Growth in Tax Revenue, 1985-2016 (2010=100) 
Note: Data on tax revenue consist of self-assessed taxes collected by Indonesia’s central government, i.e. income 
taxes and value added taxes. 
Sources: Government of Indonesia (Various Years); Indonesia Central Board of Statistics (Various Years); 
Indonesia Ministry of Finance (Various Years), analyzed.  
 
Data in Figure 3 reveal that, on average, only 51 percent of the registered taxpayers that 
are required to submit tax returns actually submitted them. Hence, there is the possibility that 
almost half of the taxpayers who were previously registered in the tax net might have escaped 
and gone back to the informal sector.  
On the other hand, there are some capacity constraints experienced by the Indonesian 
central government tax administration (i.e., Directorate General of Taxes), especially in terms of 
administrative resources. Table 2 reports comparative data on the total resources dedicated by 
governments to tax administration in selected Southeast Asia and Pacific countries, including 
Indonesia.  
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Figure 3. Taxpayers’ Formal Compliance, 2007-2016 
Source: Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (2017) 
 
Table 2. Total Costs of Tax Administration to Net Revenue Collected (%) 
Country 
Ratio of Tax Administration 
Expenditure to Net Revenue 
Collected 
Note 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Australia 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.94 0.86  
New Zealand 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.84 0.79 Excise taxes not included 
Malaysia 0.70 0.82 1.00 1.36 1.58 Indirect taxes not included 
Philippines 0.71 0.59 0.61 0.50 0.48  
Singapore 0.87 0.78 0.79 0.85 0.86 Excise taxes not included 
Thailand 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.82 0.90 Excise taxes and social contributions not included 
Indonesia 0.55 0.60 0.56 0.78 1.27 Excise taxes not included 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2018). 
 
 As apparent in Table 2, except for a significant hike in 2015, the ratio of resources 
devoted to Indonesia tax administration to the net revenue it collected is quite low compared 
with the majority of developing and developed economies in the region. Further, effective 
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administration of taxation requires the tax authority to make careful decisions in allocating its 
limited resources. The available staff resources must be devoted to deal with various tasks of a 
tax administration: taxpayer services (e.g., registering taxpayers, processing tax returns and 
payments and educating taxpayers); law enforcements (e.g., audit and collection of arrears) and 
support work streams (e.g., staff administration, finance and information technology).  
Table 3 presents the relative staff strengths in Indonesia and its neighboring countries, 
both developing and developed ones.   
 
Table 3. Relative Staffing Levels of Tax Administrations 
Country 
Ratio of Staff Usage 
Taxpayers/FTE 
Labor Force 
Participants/FTE 
Australia 1,323 699 
New Zealand 1,302 705 
Malaysia 3,299 1,488 
Philippines 9,990 4,291 
Singapore 2,845 1,128 
Thailand 2,897 1,706 
Indonesia 7,742 3,724 
Note: FTE = Full-Time Equivalent. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2016). 
 
 The first of the two variables presented in Table 3 reports the number of taxpayers served 
by one full-time equivalent (FTE) staff. This ratio for Indonesia shows the relatively high 
number of taxpayers that have to be served by one FTE staff compared with most countries in 
region. The second variable in Table 3 presents the ratio of total labor force in an economy to the 
number of FTE staff positions. Again, this variable may reflect the relatively high number of 
potential taxpayers for a staff of the Indonesian tax administration to manage. 
 
POLICY OPTIONS 
Basically, a special tax system for small taxpayers could be regarded a success if it results in the 
following sequence of events. A small, start-up business enterprise operates in the informal 
economy. A special system is designed with the stated aims to encourage such enterprises to 
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become members of the taxpaying population in the formal economy and to educate them up to a 
point at which they are able to comply with the regular tax systems (Bird & Wallace, 2004).  
On the contrary, a special tax system could be considered as a failure if it encourages 
migration of taxpayers out of the regular tax systems and into the special system. It would also 
be regarded as a failure if enterprises stay on and fraudulently exploited the special system for 
years, without time limits. Further, it would also be considered a failure if the special system 
adversely affected the long-run revenue performance compared to the revenue which could have 
been collected in the absence of such system. 
Besides wage earners, a large portion of taxpayers in the tax net may comprise of small 
enterprises. However, this class of taxpayer presents a unique challenge for policy makers. On 
the one hand, complicated tax systems may make it difficult and expensive for small taxpayers to 
comply due to the costs incurred in keeping records and the need for specific knowledge to abide 
by the complex tax laws. On the other hand, tax administrations in developing countries are 
generally constrained in their capacity and skills, however they may still have to devote valuable 
resources to keep the small enterprises in check although its payoffs in terms of revenue 
collected might be insignificant. 
In this light, the Indonesian gross receipts taxation may be seen as a compromise to 
lessening the compliance costs borne by small taxpayers and the administrative burdens on the 
side of the tax authority. Hence, despite its potentials for economic distortions, the gross receipts 
tax may serve as a second-best option to bringing the hard to tax to the formal economy and thus 
broadening the tax base. 
However, a special system particularly as distortive as the gross receipts tax should be 
limited in its use as well as should be carefully targeted toward the really small entities. In this 
respect, Indonesia has a special system in the form of a gross receipts tax for small business with 
turnover not exceeding Rp4.8 billion. This scheme is incorporated in Government Regulation 
Number 23 Year 2018 (GR-23/2018) and its principal contents are actually consistent with 
international best practices regarding the simplified taxation for small enterprises: firstly, it limits 
the time eligibility for the simplified system thus encouraging migration toward the normal 
systems and, secondly, it has a rebuttable mechanism thus small taxpayers who have the 
capability to maintain proper accounting and bookkeeping may opt out of this simplified system. 
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However, the problem is that besides the scheme of GR-23/2018, there are various gross 
receipts taxes that also are applicable for taxpayers operating in various business sectors as 
discussed previously. Hence, the classification of businesses that fall under the special system of 
gross receipts taxation is very broad. Complicating the issue of inequality, in certain industries 
the gross receipts tax system is applicable not only for small enterprises but also for large ones. 
For example, all construction service businesses fall under the gross receipts tax system 
regardless of their annual turnover thus there is no differentiation between small and large 
enterprises. Moreover, these construction enterprises would fall under the gross receipts tax 
system without time limits, thus they may be able to stay in this simplified system for years 
without having some incentives that can push them to graduate to the regular tax systems. 
Hence, one of the problems of the Indonesian gross receipts tax as a special system is that 
they may not be well targeted. When a simplified system is too broadly applicable, enterprises 
that are actually capable of bookkeeping and complying to the complexity of the regular systems 
may have the incentives to take advantage of either the lower tax rates, the lower costs of 
compliance and the lower probability of audits offered by the simplified system (Bird & 
Wallace, 2004). Therefore, limiting the scope of taxpayers eligible under the gross receipts tax 
system may be an important first step. In this respect, it might be necessary for the gross receipts 
tax system to only include taxpayers with annual turnover not exceeding Rp4.8 billion, 
regardless of their industries.  
One of the arguments frequently put forward for expanding the gross receipts taxes as 
special system is the lack of capacity on the part of the tax administration. However, a special tax 
system should not deter efforts to improving the capacity of the tax administration. A special 
system is not a justification for the lack of enforcement capability of the tax administration. In 
this light, it seems that the designers of the Indonesian tax reform of 1984 were aware of the 
need to limit the imposition of a special system, even when the capacity of the tax administration 
at that time was far from adequate. Expansions of the special tax system only occurred during 
subsequent tax reforms even though at the same time there were some improvements in tax 
administration’s capacity.8 For example, recent data collection programs particularly tax 
administration’s access to banking records should ease any doubt on the capacity of the 
 
8
 For further discussion on the capacity of Indonesia’s tax administration, see Brondolo, Silvani, Le Borgne, and 
Bosch (2008). 
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Indonesian tax administration to detect, deter and punish noncompliance. These developments 
should path the way to limiting the intrusions of the special regime in the regular tax systems, 
particularly a regime with adverse impacts on the economy as the gross receipts taxes. 
Further, it may also be important that small taxpayers be imposed with only a single tax. 
If simplification is the main purpose of the simplified system, then it may make sense that small 
enterprises be required to pay only one tax rather than a variety of taxes. This arrangement may 
support the effort aimed at keeping the registered taxpayers to stay in the tax net and not jumping 
back to the informal economy. In this light, the problem for the Indonesian small taxpayers is 
that once they enter the formal economy and registered in the tax net they may have to pay more 
than one taxes in more than one ‘simplified’ tax systems.  
For example, a seller of gold jewelry with an annual turnover less than Rp4.8 billion 
would fall under the scheme of GR-23/2018, thus he has to pay an income tax under this 
simplified regime with a rate of 0.5 percent of turnover. However, he also has to pay a ‘VAT’ at 
2 percent of turnover without having the right to reimburse the input VATs paid from previous 
production and distribution channels. Hence, in essence he has to pay two types of gross receipts 
taxes with different rates (and different form of tax returns): one under the simplified income tax 
system and one under the simplified VAT system. If the tax burdens and compliance costs which 
arise from these simplified systems were higher than the willingness of the small taxpayers to 
bear them, then these taxpayers might have the incentives to go back to the underground 
economy or may even never migrate out the underground economy and thus would be unlikely 
to be registered in the tax net. 
Moreover, if one of the concerns for the special regime is the limited resources available 
to the tax administration, then a measure to confront the problem of bracket creeping might be 
important to be put in place. The Indonesian special system is using turnover as a threshold to 
determine eligibility. As time goes by, this threshold would be eroded by inflation hence 
taxpayers who do not have the real capacity to comply with the complexity of the regular system 
may be ineligible for the special system simply because their turnover have exceeded this eroded 
threshold. Indexing the threshold to inflation may solve this problem; therein the simplified 
system could be expected to be populated by the really small taxpayers (in terms of turnover) 
who are not ready yet to abide by the demanding requirements of the regular taxation systems. 
This would ease the burden on the part of the tax administration and thus could free some of its 
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resources to be focused on the medium and large taxpayers in the regular system with potential 
revenue payoffs. 
Last but not least, simplified taxation system is not a replacement for good tax 
administration. The yield, incidence and efficiency of a tax system may depend on how it is 
administered. Moreover, establishing an environment of voluntary compliance is an important 
task for an effective tax administration (Bird, 2004). To do so, a tax administration should firstly 
have a good idea on its ‘revenue gap’, as this would allow for the assessment of the potential tax 
base. In addition, the tax administration should also properly undertake the technically complex 
task of audit. Assuring that those registered in the tax system file in a timely manner and pay the 
amounts due are critical and thus must also be paid a close attention. Non-filers and incorrect 
payments must also be immediately followed up. The tax administration must minimize the 
chances that taxation be used as a cheap source of finance by imposing adequate interest charges 
on late payments. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Gross receipts taxes could be distortive to an economy; however, when well-designed and 
properly managed it could play a not insignificant role in broadening the tax base particularly 
from enterprises operating in the informal economy. It seems that the second-best strategy is to 
employ the sales tax specifically as a special system to encouraging small, hard-to-tax businesses 
to be part of the taxpaying population. Unfortunately, one prominent characteristic of the 
Indonesia gross receipts taxes is its breadth of coverage which reaches far beyond its intended 
purpose as a special system for small taxpayers. Considering the distortive effects of gross 
receipts taxes, it may be reasonable to reduce its scope of employment. 
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